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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs contend that the minimum coverage provision of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act will violate their constitutional rights to liberty,
intimate and expressive association, and privacy.  Given the importance of the
minimum coverage provision, appellees respectfully request oral argument.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Plaintiffs invoked the district court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
Their second amended complaint challenged the minimum coverage provision of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care Act”) on four legal
theories set out in four counts.  The district court dismissed Counts 2, 3, and 4 of the
complaint on November 22, 2010.  Acting sua sponte, the court entered judgment on
those counts pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) on February 28, 2011.  Plaintiffs filed
a notice of appeal on March 18, 2011.  This Court lacks appellate jurisdiction for
reasons discussed in the Argument.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction.
2. If the Court has appellate jurisdiction, whether the district court correctly
held that the minimum coverage provision does not violate plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights to liberty, expressive and intimate association, or privacy.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act’s minimum
coverage provision.  When that provision takes effect in 2014, it will require that non-
exempted individuals maintain a minimum level of health insurance or pay a tax
penalty.  26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A.  Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint (R. 45)
advanced four different legal theories as to why the provision is unconstitutional: that
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it exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause power (Count 1); violates plaintiffs’ right
to freedom of expressive and intimate association under the First and Fifth
Amendments (Count 2); violates plaintiffs’ substantive due process right to liberty
to refuse payment for unwanted medical services (Count 3); and violates plaintiffs’
constitutional right to privacy (Count 4).
The district court dismissed Counts 2, 3, and 4, holding that those counts did
not plausibly allege a violation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.  See R. 58-1 at 10-
11.  The court declined to rule on Count 1, noting that the question of Congress’s
Article I power to enact the minimum coverage provision was then pending before
this Court in Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011 WL 2556039
(6th Cir. 2011).  See R. 58-1 at 4-5.
Acting sua sponte, the district court entered final judgment on Counts 2, 3, and
4 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).  See R. 82.  Plaintiffs filed a motion for
clarification, in which they asked the district court to rule promptly on Count 1. 
R. 83-1.  They explained that “bifurcated appeals by the same plaintiffs on the same
core of operative facts would disserve judicial economy and conflict with precedent
concerning administration of the United States courts of appeal.”  Id. at 9.  The
district court denied the motion, concluding that it is “within the sound discretion of
2
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the Court to defer a ruling in anticipation of binding precedent and/or guidance from
the Sixth Circuit on an issue presently before the Court.”  R. 86 at 2-3.
On June 29, 2011, this Court issued its decision in Thomas More.  This Court
upheld the minimum coverage provision on its face as a valid exercise of Congress’s
commerce power. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. Statutory Background
The Affordable Care Act is a comprehensive reform of our national health care
system.  The Act seeks to ameliorate the crisis in the interstate market for health care
services, which accounts for more than 17% of the nation’s gross domestic product. 
Millions of people without health insurance consume many billions of dollars
worth of health care services each year.  As a class, they fail to pay the full cost of
those services and shift the uncompensated costs of their care — totaling $43 billion
in 2008 — to health care providers regularly engaged in interstate commerce. 
Providers pass on much of this cost to insurance companies, which also operate
interstate.  The result is higher premiums that, in turn, make insurance unaffordable
to even more people.  At the same time, insurers use restrictive underwriting practices
to deny coverage or charge higher premiums to millions because they have
pre-existing medical conditions.
3
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The Affordable Care Act addresses these national problems through measures
designed to make affordable health care coverage widely available, protect consumers
from restrictive underwriting practices, and reduce the uncompensated care that is
obtained by the uninsured and paid for by other participants in the health care market.
First, the Act builds upon the existing nationwide system of employer-based
health insurance, the principal private mechanism for health care financing.  Congress
established tax incentives for small businesses to purchase health insurance for their
employees.  26 U.S.C.A. § 45R.  It also prescribed tax penalties for certain large
employers if the employer does not offer full-time employees adequate coverage and
at least one full-time employee receives a tax credit to assist with the purchase of
coverage in a health insurance exchange established under the Act.  Id. § 4980H.
Second, the Act provides for the creation of health insurance exchanges to
allow individuals, families, and small businesses to use their collective buying power
to obtain prices competitive with those of large-employer group plans.  42 U.S.C.A.
§ 18031.
Third, for individuals and families with household income between 133% and
400% of the federal poverty line who purchase insurance through an exchange,
Congress offered federal tax credits for payment of health insurance premiums.  26
U.S.C.A. § 36B(a), (b).  Congress also authorized federal payments to help cover
4
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out-of-pocket expenses such as co-payments or deductibles for eligible individuals
who purchase coverage through an exchange.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18071.  In addition,
Congress expanded eligibility for Medicaid to cover individuals with income up to
133% of the federal poverty line.  Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII).
Fourth, the Act regulates insurers to prohibit industry practices that have
prevented people from obtaining and maintaining health insurance.  The Act bars
insurers from refusing coverage because of pre-existing medical conditions, canceling
insurance absent fraud or intentional misrepresentation of material fact, charging
higher premiums based on a person’s medical history, and placing lifetime dollar caps
on benefits.  Id. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1(a), 300gg-3(a), 300gg-4(a), 300gg-11, 300gg-12.
Fifth, the minimum coverage provision at issue here will require, beginning in
2014, that non-exempted individuals maintain a minimum level of health insurance
or pay a tax penalty.  26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A.  The minimum coverage requirement may
be satisfied through enrollment in an eligible employer-sponsored plan; an individual
market plan, including one offered through a health insurance exchange; a
grandfathered health plan; certain government-sponsored programs such as Medicare,
Medicaid, or TRICARE; or similar coverage to be recognized by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services (“HHS”) in coordination with the Secretary of the
Treasury.  Id. § 5000A(f).  The tax penalty will not apply to individuals whose
5
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household income is insufficient to require them to file a federal income tax return,
whose premium payments would exceed 8% of their household income, or who
establish (under standards set by the HHS Secretary) that the requirement would
impose a hardship.  Id. § 5000A(e).
In enacting the minimum coverage provision, Congress made detailed findings
that establish the foundation for the exercise of its commerce power.  Congress found
that the minimum coverage provision “regulates activity that is commercial and
economic in nature” — how people pay for services in the interstate health care
market.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(A).  Congress found that, as a class, people who
“forego health insurance coverage and attempt to self-insure” fail to pay for the
medical services that they consume, and shift substantial costs to providers and
insured consumers, raising average family premiums by more than $1,000 a year.  Id.
§ 18091(a)(2)(A), (F).  In addition, Congress found that the minimum coverage
requirement is “essential” to the Act’s guaranteed issue and community rating reforms
that will prevent insurers from relying on medical condition or history to deny
coverage or set premiums.  Id. § 18091(a)(2)(I).  Congress found that, without the
minimum coverage requirement, many people would exploit these new consumer
protections by waiting to purchase health insurance until they needed care, which
would undermine the effective functioning of insurance markets.  Ibid.
6
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The Congressional Budget Office has projected that the Act’s various
provisions, taken in combination, will reduce the number of non-elderly people
without insurance by about 33 million by 2019.  Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf
to John Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, at 8, table 3 (Feb. 18,
2011).
II. District Court Proceedings
Plaintiffs are two individuals, James Grapek and Maurice Thompson, and the
U.S. Citizens Association (“USCA”), a “national civic league.”  R. 45 ¶ 12 (Second
Amended Complaint).  The individual plaintiffs state that they do not have health
insurance and “prefer to select and receive health care outside of the present health
insurance system from physicians who accept payment out of pocket.”  R. 50-6, ¶ 7
(Thompson Decl.); R. 50-5, ¶ 6 (Grapek Decl.) (similar).
Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint focused on a single provision of the
Affordable Care Act — the minimum coverage provision — alleging  that the
requirement to obtain minimum coverage is unconstitutional on four legal grounds,
set out in four counts.  Count 1 alleged that the provision exceeds Congress’s
authority under the Commerce Clause.  See R. 45 at 15-17.  Count 2 alleged that the
same provision violates plaintiffs’ freedom of expressive and intimate association
under the First and Fifth Amendments.  Id. at 17-19.  Count 3 alleged that this
7
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provision also violates plaintiffs’ substantive due process liberty right to refuse
payment for unwanted medical services.  Id. at 19-20.  And Count 4 alleged that the
provision violates plaintiffs’ right to privacy.  Id. at 21-23.
The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss Counts 2, 3, and
4, explaining that plaintiffs failed to allege any plausible violation of their rights to
association, substantive due process, or privacy.  See R. 58-1 at 10-11.
The government moved to stay proceedings on Count 1 in light of the appeal
that was then pending before this Court in Thomas More Law Center v. Obama,
No. 10-2388, which also presented an enumerated powers challenge to the minimum
coverage provision.  See R. 60 & 60-1.  Plaintiffs opposed a stay.  See R. 61.  The
district court declined to stay proceedings and ordered summary judgment briefing. 
See R. 64.
Subsequently, the district court, acting sua sponte, entered final judgment on
Counts 2, 3, and 4 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).  See R. 82.  The court did not
address plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause challenge or the government’s alternative
argument that the minimum coverage provision is also a valid exercise of Congress’s
taxing power.  The court noted that other cases presenting such issues were already
pending before this Court and other courts of appeals, and it “question[ed] the
relevance of any ruling it may make regarding the Commerce Clause issue given the
8
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more advanced stage of challenges to the Act in other jurisdictions and the ultimate
impact of the appellate rulings in those cases on the instant case.”  Id. at 3.  
In entering judgment on Counts 2, 3, and 4, the district court reasoned that its
prior opinion “entirely disposes of those claims,” and concluded that “the nature of
the constitutional challenges in Claims 2, 3, and 4 are independent from” Count 1. 
Id. at 2-3.  The court held that “the litigants are best served by allowing an immediate
appeal of the Court’s dismissal of Counts 2, 3 and 4 given the uncertainty of the time
period in which the constitutionality of the Act relative to the Commerce Clause will
be determined in the federal courts.”  Id. at 3.
Plaintiffs filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration, in which they
asked the district court to clarify that it would rule promptly on their Commerce
Clause claim.  R. 83-1.  They urged the district court to rule on Count 1 in order “to
avoid an unintended consequence: prejudice to their appellate rights and denial of
certain argument necessary for the Court of Appeals to adjudicate the
constitutionality of the Individual Mandate on all potentially dispositive grounds.” 
R. 83-1 at 2.  Plaintiffs stated that, without such a ruling, they would “be required to
proceed with two separate appeals to the Sixth Circuit arising from the same core of
operative facts” regarding this single provision.  Id. at 9.  They advised the district
court that “bifurcated appeals by the same plaintiffs on the same core of operative
9
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facts would disserve judicial economy and conflict with precedent concerning
administration of the United States courts of appeal.”  Ibid.
The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion.  See R. 86.  The court noted that
this Court’s decision in Thomas More “will likely control — or at a minimum inform
— the outcome of the instant action with respect to Count 1.”  Id. at 2.  The court
concluded that it was “within the sound discretion of the Court to defer a ruling in
anticipation of binding precedent and/or guidance from the Sixth Circuit on an issue
presently before the Court.”  Id. at 2-3.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court’s rulings present issues of law that are subject to de novo
review in this Court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.  This appeal should be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a district court to direct
the entry of final judgment with respect to “fewer than all the claims” in a case if the
court determines that there is no just reason for delay.  However, different theories
of liability regarding the same provision, arising from the same set of “operative
facts,” do not constitute distinct claims within the meaning of Rule 54(b).  See
Lowery v. Fed. Express Corp., 426 F.3d 817, 821 (6th Cir. 2005).  Here, plaintiffs
10
Case: 11-3327     Document: 006111006145     Filed: 07/06/2011     Page: 18
challenged the minimum coverage provision on four legal theories.  Thus, plaintiffs
correctly advised the district court that all of their counts “aris[e] from the same core
of operative facts.”  R. 83-1 at 9.  The Rule 54(b) certification was improper, and this
Court lacks appellate jurisdiction.
II.  If the Court were to reach the merits, the judgment of the district court
should be affirmed.  The district court correctly held that plaintiffs failed to allege any
plausible violation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, right to intimate or
expressive association, or right to privacy.  Indeed, plaintiffs  misunderstand what the
minimum coverage provision, by its plain terms, will require.  The provision directs
that, beginning in 2014, non-exempted individuals maintain a minimum level of
health insurance or pay a tax penalty.  It will not require plaintiffs to accept unwanted
medical care; it will not prevent plaintiffs from expressing their views about
insurance (or any other matter); and it will not require plaintiffs to undergo medical
examinations or disclose personal medical information.
Even if plaintiffs’ reading of the minimum coverage provision were correct,
their understanding of the Constitution is not.  There is no substantive due process
right “to refuse payment for unwanted medical service.”  Pl. Br. 8 (Question 1). 
Associations with insurance companies do not implicate the freedom of intimate or
expressive association.  Ibid. (Question 2).  And the disclosure of medical
11
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information to insurance companies does not implicate any constitutionally protected
right of privacy.  Ibid. (Question 3).
ARGUMENT
I. This Court Lacks Appellate Jurisdiction.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a district court to “direct the entry
of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties” if the court
determines that there is no just reason for delay.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).  The propriety
of a Rule 54(b) certification presents a threshold issue of appellate jurisdiction. 
“[T]his Court is without appellate jurisdiction if the certification was improper.” 
Lowery, 426 F.3d at 820 (citing Corrosioneering, Inc. v. Thyssen Envtl. Sys., Inc., 807
F.2d 1279, 1282 (6th Cir. 1986)).  Accordingly, this Court must determine de novo
whether a judgment represents “‘an ultimate disposition of an individual claim
entered in the course of a multiple claims action.’”  Lowery, 426 F.3d at 821 (quoting
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 (1980)).
Different theories of liability do not constitute different claims within the
meaning of Rule 54(b).  Lowery, 426 F.3d at 821.  In Lowery, for example, the
plaintiff sued under Title VII alleging that his employer  had retaliated against him
for a prior grievance that he had filed.  He also alleged that the employer had
breached the contract settling the prior grievance, which had promised that there
12
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would be no retaliation.  The district court dismissed the Title VII count, but not the
contract cause of action, and certified the order for appeal under Rule 54(b).  This
Court dismissed the appeal, holding that retaliation was the gravamen of both
“claims.”  The Court cited its repeated rulings that, “‘[e]ven though different theories
of liability may have been asserted, the concept of a “claim” under Rule 54(b) denotes
the aggregate of operative facts which give rise to a right enforceable in the courts.’” 
Ibid. (quoting McIntyre v. First Nat’l Bank of Cincinnati, 585 F.2d 190, 192 (6th
Cir.1978) (citations omitted)).  
Just as a statutory and contract challenge to a single act of employment
discrimination constitute a single claim, so do multiple theories for challenging the
constitutionality of a single statutory provision constitute a single claim.  See Yee v.
City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1992) (“Petitioners’ arguments that the
ordinance constitutes a taking in two different ways, by physical occupation and by
regulation, are not separate claims.  They are, rather, separate arguments in support
of a single claim — that the ordinance effects an unconstitutional taking.”).  
In this case, the four counts set forth in the second amended complaint do
nothing more than assert alternative theories for invalidating the minimum coverage
provision, “separate arguments in support of a single claim.”  Ibid.  Plaintiffs
correctly advised the district court that all of the counts “aris[e] from the same core
13
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of operative facts.”  R. No. 83-1 at 9.  The district court’s Rule 54(b) certification was
improper, and this Court therefore lacks appellate jurisdiction.
II. The Minimum Coverage Provision Does Not Violate Plaintiffs’
Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Association, or Privacy.
If this Court were to reach the merits, it should affirm the decision of the
district court.  The minimum coverage provision does not even touch upon, much less
violate, any of the fundamental rights that plaintiffs invoke.1
A. The Minimum Coverage Provision Does Not Violate Plaintiffs’
Fundamental Liberty Interests.
The Due Process Clause protects those fundamental liberty interests that are
“objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
were sacrificed.”  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (citations
and internal quotation omitted).  These freedoms include the “rights to marry,” “to
have children,” “to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children,” “to marital
privacy,” “to use contraception,” “to bodily integrity,” and “to abortion.”  Id. at 720. 
The Supreme Court also has “assumed, and strongly suggested, that the Due Process
 The government does not dispute that plaintiff Grapek adequately alleged1
standing to challenge to the minimum coverage provision.  See R. 50-5 at 5 (Grapek
Decl.) (representing that Grapek must begin saving immediately to have the funds to
pay for health insurance when the minimum essential coverage provision takes
effect). 
14
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Clause protects the traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.” 
Ibid.
The Supreme Court has cautioned against recognizing new fundamental rights,
“lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the
policy preferences of the Members of th[e] Court.”  Ibid.  Thus, this Court explained,
“‘identifying a new fundamental right subject to the protections of substantive due
process is often an uphill battle, as the list of fundamental rights is short.’”  Grinter
v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 573 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Does v. Munoz, 507 F.3d 961,
964 (6th Cir. 2007)).  “When reviewing a substantive due process claim, [a court]
must first craft a ‘careful description of the asserted right,’ ... and then determine
whether that right is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ and
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that it can be considered a
‘fundamental right.’”  Doe v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 500 (6th Cir.
2007) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), and Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
at 721).  The Supreme Court has “expressly counseled lower courts to be ‘reluctant
to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for decision
making in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.’”  Blau v. Fort Thomas
Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 393-94 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
at 720).
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Plaintiffs invoke a fundamental right “to refuse unwanted medical service.” 
Pl. Br. 25.  In Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), the
Supreme Court explained that “[t]he principle that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may
be inferred from [its] prior decisions.”  Id. at 278.  For example, the Cruzan Court
explained, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905), the Court
balanced an individual’s liberty interest in declining an unwanted smallpox vaccine
against the State’s interest in preventing disease.  See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. 
Similarly, in Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), the Court “recognized that
prisoners possess ‘a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted
administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.’”  Id. at 221-22 (quoted in Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278).
The Affordable Care Act’s minimum coverage provision in no way implicates
this fundamental right to refuse unwanted medical care.  By its plain terms, the
provision will not require that people obtain medical services of any kind.  Instead,
when the provision takes effect in 2014, it will require that non-exempted individuals
maintain a minimum level of health insurance or else pay a tax penalty.  26 U.S.C.A.
§ 5000A.  Whether they have insurance or not, individuals will still be able to
determine whether to obtain medical care, what care to obtain, when, and from whom. 
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Indeed, though they invoke the Cruzan line of cases, plaintiffs do not actually
contend that the minimum coverage provision will require them to obtain unwanted
medical care.  Instead, they assert that the provision will interfere with their economic
freedom by requiring them to pay for insurance or tax penalties.  However, “no court
has invalidated [an insurance] mandate under the Due Process Clause or any other
liberty-based guarantee of the Constitution.”  Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, *32
(Sutton, J., concurring in the judgment).  While such a claim, derived from freedom
of contract, “would have found Constitutional support in the Supreme Court’s
decisions in the years prior to the New Deal legislation of the mid-1930’s, when the
Due Process Clause was interpreted to reach economic rights and liberties,” the
Lochner-era doctrine “has long since been discarded.”  Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1161 (N.D. Fla. 2010).   Plaintiffs cite2
no support for the “right not to pay” that they would have the Court deem
fundamental.  Pl. Br. 27.
 Cross-appeals are pending in the Florida case, but the plaintiffs did not2
challenge the district court’s dismissal of their substantive due process claim.  Florida
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067 (11th Cir.).  
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B. The Minimum Coverage Provision Does Not Violate Plaintiffs’
Rights to Freedom of Intimate or Expressive Association.
1. The provision does not violate plaintiffs’ right 
to intimate association.
Plaintiffs allege that the minimum coverage provision will “violate Plaintiffs’
freedom of intimate association.”  R. 45 at 18 (Second Amended Complaint).  They
allege that they have a “fundamental privacy right to select a doctor of their choosing,
one whose methods and approaches they approve,” and “a right not to associate with
doctors who, and insurers that cover, methods or approaches rejected by Plaintiffs.” 
Ibid.
As an initial matter, the Constitution’s protection of intimate association does
not extend to the relationships that plaintiffs describe.  The right to intimate
association is derived from the due process right to privacy and “‘protects those
relationships ... that presuppose deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily
few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctly personal aspects of one’s life.’” 
Anderson v. City of LaVergne, 371 F.3d 879, 881-82 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bd. of
Dir. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987) (internal
citation omitted)).  Intimate associations are “highly personal relationships”
characterized by “relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin
18
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and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the
relationship.”  Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, 620 (1984).  “The personal
affiliations that exemplify these considerations, and that therefore suggest some
relevant limitations on the relationships that might be entitled to this sort of
constitutional protection, are those that attend the creation and sustenance of a
family-marriage.”  Id. at 619.
By contrast, association with a “large business enterprise” such as an insurance
company does not qualify as intimate.  Id. at 620.  Nor are relationships with doctors
the type protected by the freedom of intimate association.  See Nat’l Ass’n for the
Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th
Cir. 2000) (rejecting claim that the psychoanalyst-patient relationship warrants
intimate association protection).
But, again, even if plaintiffs had a constitutional right to associate with doctors
of their choosing, the minimum coverage provision would not affect it.  Plaintiffs
claim that, if they spend money on health insurance or tax penalties, they will not
have the “resources they need” to pay medical providers of their choosing.  R. 45
¶ 44.  But “[m]oney is fungible,” Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 601 (2004),
and any government-imposed expenditure such as taxes or mandatory car insurance
could be said to reduce funds available for other commercial associations.  That is not
19
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the type of regulation of the “precise ... associational right in question” that implicates
the freedom of intimate association.  Angstadt v. Midd-West Sch. Dist., 377 F.3d 338,
343-44 (3d Cir. 2004).
2.  The provision does not interfere with plaintiffs’ 
right of expressive association.
 The right of expressive association is the “right to associate for the purpose of
speaking.”  Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 68 (2006).  It is a “correlative freedom to
engage in group effort” to the end of exercising First Amendment rights.  U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 618, 622.  It is protected because “[a]n individual’s freedom to
speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could
not be vigorously protected from interference by the State” without also protecting
a right to associate for these purposes.  Ibid.
In keeping with its purpose, the right to expressive association is implicated
only where there is a group engaged in constitutionally protected expression.  This
occurs where there is interference in the membership of a group that “‘engage[s] in
expressive activity that could be impaired’” and “the government action in question
‘significantly burden[s]’ the group’s expression.”  Miller v. City of Cincinnati, 622
F.3d 524, 538 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted, alterations in original).  When the
government regulates “mere association” not related to membership in a group
engaged in expression, the right is not implicated.  FAIR, 547 U.S. at 69.
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The minimum coverage provision does not impair plaintiffs’ ability to engage
in expressive conduct.  Plaintiffs remain “free to associate to voice their disapproval”
of insurance, or, for that matter, to advance any other opinion.  Id. at 69-70.  Nor is
plaintiff U.S. Citizens Association required to admit insurance companies as members
of the organization.  U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623.  The Supreme Court has made
plain that an organization “cannot erect a shield” against a law “simply by asserting
that mere association would impair its message.”  FAIR, 547 U.S. at 69, 70 (quotation
marks omitted) (holding that “[a] military recruiter’s mere presence on campus does
not violate a law school’s right to associate, regardless of how repugnant the law
school considers the recruiter’s message”).  Thus, plaintiffs’ expressive association
claim has no basis.
C. The Minimum Coverage Provision Does Not Violate Plaintiffs’
Right to Privacy.
Plaintiffs allege that the government cannot constitutionally “compel disclosure
of USCA members’ private medical information to a private insurer, including, but
not limited to, data concerning or derived from (1) blood samples, (2) DNA samples,
(3) urine samples, (6) physical examinations, and (6) past or current illnesses,
diseases, or medications.”  R. 45 ¶ 53.  They allege that such forced disclosures would
violate plaintiffs’ “Right to Privacy arising from the Fifth Amendment liberty
provision, the Ninth Amendment rights retained by the people, and rights emanating
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from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.”  Id. ¶ 56.
The minimum coverage provision does not, however, compel any such
disclosures; it requires that non-exempted individuals maintain a minimum level of
insurance or pay a tax penalty.  Plaintiffs assert that insurance companies will choose
to seek such information because “the health of its customers is essential to profit
margins.”  Pl. Br. 53-54.  Beginning in 2014, however, the Affordable Care Act will
bar insurance companies from denying coverage or setting premiums on the basis of
an individual’s medical condition or history.  See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1(a),
300gg-3(a), 300gg-4(a).  Thus, plaintiffs’ asserted injury is speculative.  See Wilson
v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (rejecting due process claim where
concerns about possible future disclosure of DNA sample were “purely speculative”).
Moreover, another federal law — the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) — imposes strict limits on the manner in
which insurance companies may use or disclose individuals’ medical information. 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d, et seq.; 45 C.F.R. § 164.502.  The Supreme Court recently
rejected an “informational privacy” claim based in part on protections against
disclosure to the public.  See NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 761-63 (2011).
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In any event, “legitimate requests for medical information do not constitute an
invasion of the right to privacy.”  Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1539 (6th Cir.
1987); see also Moore v. Prevo, 379 F. App’x 425, 427 (6th Cir. 2010)
(distinguishing between disclosure of inmate’s HIV status to another inmate and
disclosure to a corrections officer).  “‘[D]isclosures of private medical information
to doctors, to hospital personnel, to insurance companies, and to public health
agencies are often an essential part of modern medical practice even when the
disclosure may reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient.’”  In re Zuniga,
714 F.2d 632, 641 (6th Cir. 1983) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977))
(this Court’s emphasis).  Thus, even if the plaintiffs were correct in their speculation
that insurers in the future will seek medical information from them, they have not
plausibly alleged that the minimum coverage provision will violate their
constitutional privacy rights.
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CONCLUSION
This appeal should be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.  In the
alternative, the judgment of the district court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted,
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